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T

he paradigm of war has been the most constant and destructive
aspect of human civilization throughout history. The horror of war,
carried out by two opposing sides each proclaiming moral authority,
is perhaps the most haunting and paradoxical of human capabilities.
In many modern wars, however, “tactics of ethnic cleansing and genocide
have replaced the strict codes of conduct and chivalry” that had protected the
innocent from violent conflict over past centuries from Africa to China. (Singer
2006:4) Crimes such as rape, torture, and the recruitment of children as soldiers
have increasingly become regular weapons of war in the most deprived regions
of the Third World.1 In Africa and the war in the Balkans during the 1990’s, over
90 percent of casualties were civilian, compared to 50 percent in World War 2
and 10 percent in World War 1. Disturbingly, moreover, there are hundreds of
thousands of child soldiers in the world today. (Singer 2006:4-5)
This result has not been born of an innate human dissolve in moral fabric or of
moral deficiencies between cultures. The cause is rather predominantly centered
in socially constructed phenomena on a global scale; a construct of transnational
power elite whose prerogatives lie in the concentration of wealth and power,
and who overlook the necessary obligations of power must yield to those who
bear the unwanted affects of a steep, global, hierarchal structure. The aim of the
author is to uncover the systemic implications of corporations, governments and
international financial institutions and how they have worked correspondingly
to cause and exacerbate poverty, violence, and political and social unrest by
promoting a unilateral agenda of global capitalism. This paper hopes to clarify
how the collective actions of these entities has worsened simultaneously both
abysmal poverty and political violence in the developing world. I will focus on
two countries in different hemispheres, Colombia and Indonesia, to reflect the
global pervasiveness of this problem.
Martin Wolf (2005:16), a proponent of neo-liberalism, states: “Because space
always matters, so does territorial control. Because territorial control matters,
so do states. For this simple reason, economic processes will not compel the
death of states, unless a state is expunged, whether voluntarily…or forcibly
[emphasis added].” However, because “the [current] state of war has…become
our permanent global condition…war has become regulating by constructing
and imposing its own legal framework…” (Hardt and Negri 2004:22) In other
words, the truncated possibilities of national stability and the killing of many are
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in accord with such economic processes. As such processes cause
instability, those who threaten the stability of the destabilizing
order, as is only a rational conclusion, must be forcefully cutdown through military means.
The Arms Trade
The neo-liberal system of our time has allowed almost all aspects
of civilization, both material and immaterial, to become subject
to international trade, including arms (assault rifles, grenades,
mortars, etc). Easy and cheap access to small arms due to constant
expansions of international ‘free-trade’ fuels internal conflict
throughout the developing world. (Singer 2006) These weapons
likely end up in the hands of rebel groups as well as state armies
and paramilitaries, some of which are hired by governments
and multinational corporations to protect petroleum, coal, and
natural gas extraction sites. (Chomsky 2006; Aviles 2006; Pilger
1996; 2005) Companies such as Exxon Mobil in Indonesia, Shell
in Nigeria, BP and Occidental Petroleum in Colombia, and Total
and Unocal in Burma, among others, have partnered with the
brutal governments of these countries. (Vogel 2005; Pilger 1996,
Aviles 2006) Meanwhile, as one of many unfortunate examples,
rebels that infiltrate the Kenyan border from surrounding wartorn African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Burundi can purchase an AK-47 for roughly the price of a
goat, $5 U.S. (Singer 2006:48) Peter Singer (2006:47) also clarifies
that “the consequences [of the “glut of the market” in small arms]
is that the primary weapons of war have steeply fallen in price
over the last few decades. This has made it easier for any willing
organization to obtain them and then turn children into soldiers
at a minimal cost.” Meanwhile, more than 60 percent of arms
worldwide stem from 38 U.S companies, with many newer, lighter
models easier to operate being placed in the hands of children.
(Chomsky 2006; Singer 2006) Bever (1996:252) claims, in the case
of Africa, that little access to sufficient land and food has engaged
many young men and boys to take up arms and ignite guerrilla or
tribal warfare. Meanwhile, there is more than enough food in the
world to feed everybody with plenty left over. (Gallagher 2006)
Further, as pointed out by Singer (2006), many rebel groups who
otherwise would not have the resources and numbers to effectively
wage war against the state, can, however, when the recruitment of
children is exercised. While basic foodstuffs, infrastructure, and
sanitation is extremely lacking in many developing countries, the
high availability of sophisticated weapons at cheap costs allows
disgruntled and impoverished groups to wage hate-mongering,
destructive wars. While a child may not have access to basic
sanitation or be able to overcome malnutrition, he or she may
still have access to a gun.
Anderson, Cavanagh and Lee (2005:64) claim that “the U.S
government has used globalization as an excuse to loosen
restrictions on arms exports, arguing that U.S weapon makers
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need to export more to stay globally competitive.” U.S arms
exports doubled between 1987 and 2000. (Anderson, Cavanagh,
Lee 2005:64) Though 96 percent of the U.S population opposes
the free-sale of arms, such an international market is “strongly
supported by high-tech industry,” apparently overriding public
opinion. (Chomsky 2000:128) This shows who the workings of
policy at the highest levels primarily serve, even while helping
to fuse violence and oppression abroad. Meanwhile, a mere 80
billion dollars, one-half of one-percent of global income, can
provide sufficient food and basic housing, health services, and
education to all poor children in the developing world. (Gallagher
2006) Priorities of those in power are evidently backward.
Indonesia
The poor of Indonesia have long been subject to a brutal and
corrupt military, supported tacitly by much of the West. The
arms trade has been disproportionately favorable to the British
and U.S economies, as the allies sharply escalated their arms
exports throughout the last two-and-a-half decades. Indonesia
became the number one recipient of British arms throughout
the 1980s, gaining access to U.K aircraft, tanks, and machines
guns, all used in the illicit invasion of East Timor. (Pilger 1998;
Chomsky 2003) Blum (2005:188) clarifies, moreover, that illegal
embargos containing U.S military arms increased throughout
the late 1990’s as the number of Indonesian atrocities in East
Timor correspondingly accelerated. Between 1975 and 2000,
the Indonesian military slaughtered well over 200,000 out of a
population of 700,000 East Timorese, using British and American
arms. (Pilger 1998; Chomsky 2003; Blum 2005; Parry 2005) At
the same time, Indonesia has long been considered by many
U.S elite as “the greatest prize of Asia,” in the words of Richard
Nixon, for its rich supply of natural resources reaped by Western
companies. (Pilger 1998; 2001; Blum 2005) An unfathomable
amount of political violence abroad has become apparently
acceptable when appropriated to the interests of Western business.
Though it is unfortunate that many developing regions, holding
a disproportionate amount of the world’s natural resources,
have politically corrupt and often violent leadership, it can not
be considered acceptable to rationalize tacit cooperation and
support for brutality for national capital interests of the West.
Today, there are at least 1,000 active child combatants in
Indonesia. The ethnic conflict currently engulfing the Indonesia
province of Java, where Islamic rebels are violently pursuing
autonomy from the State, has involved the use of child soldiers
by both sides, equally brutal. Children as young as seven years
old have even been sent to the battlefield with firebombs in
their backpacks.2 (Singer 2006:26,120) Despite the human rights
abuses and atrocities that have been carried out for over four
decades by the brutal Indonesian military, the TNI, the Bush
Administration has recently asked for $6.5 million in military aid
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for Indonesia, and, without consulting Congress, has invoked a
national security waiver to override longstanding human rights
restrictions on aid to the Indonesian military. Such action is
simply unconscionable given the Indonesian regime’s irrefutably
horrendous record of human rights violations.3 Instead of urging
a diplomatic resolution, the Bush administration continues to
stand behind unilateral ideological rationalizations for violence.
Yet violence is rarely, if ever an acceptable solution to violence,
especially when principles of justice are ignored by the world’s
most powerful government supporting a brutally oppressive
regime they consider allies.
Conditions brought on by the IMF in Indonesia have been largely
implicated as causal factors of the East Asian Economic Crisis
which decimated the Indonesian economy, preceding widespread
outbreaks of ethnic conflict in the country. (Stiglitz 2002:18) Nouri
Abdul Razzak of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization
stated that “the [neo-liberal] policies of the international financial
institutions are contributing to the impoverishment of the
world’s people, the degradation of the global environment, and
the violation of the most fundamental human rights.” (Chomsky
2000:136) Such liberalization policies include the privatization of
state owned enterprises; devaluation of currency; reduced taxes
on imports; and weakening of labor standards, among others.
(Gallagher 2006) “The majority of local [Indonesian] companies
[were] devastated by interest rates of up to 50%” resulting from
the banking structure implemented by the IMF in the country.4
According to Kingsbury (2002:75), Indonesia’s debt in June of
1997 was US $115 billion, more than 60% of the country’s GDP.
By mid-2000, such debt had reached a high of $140 billion.
Moreover, during the economic collapse in Indonesia, 20 million
more people began earning less than a $1 a day. The number of
Indonesians living in poverty doubled, and the effects are still
felt, disproportionately, by women and children.5 When hungry
populations then rose-up amidst the economic collapse, the
Suharto regime ordered numerous offensives to violently cutdown the mostly non-violent protests. People of all ages were
murdered in mass executions. 39,000 people were killed in such
operations during the latter half of the 1990’s and the Suharto
regime faced no international penalties. (Simons 2000:226; Parry
2005) Loans continued to flow from the IMF and World Bank
partnership into the hands of the Suharto regime amidst obvious
corruption and atrocities, without changes in distribution
methods to better reach the poor. (Pilger 2001; Stiglitz 2002)
While the country is still recovering slowly from the economic
collapse, a great deal of state terrorism is sanctioned in Indonesia
today as an efficient way of initiating profitable projects on land

inconveniently home to thousands of poor Indonesians already
in desperate economic situations.6 These projects, in turn, have
generated little wealth back into areas of the economy where it
is needed most, like education and health care, as foreign capital
often leaves the country as fast as it enters. (Pilger 2001; Kingsbury
2002:70)
An Amnesty International report notes that in January of 2007,
a child and two others were shot and killed when security forces
working under government control opened fire on the village
of Waghete.7 There were a total of six other incidents around
the same period of time where security forces shot unarmed
civilians during forced, large scale evictions. These “evictions” are
government ordered operations where police, military officials,
or gangs hired and armed by the government use force to clear
out slums for building or oil exploration performed by a majority
of foreign companies.8
Exxon Mobil is one company taking part in such oppression
in Indonesia. The massive U.S oil and coal company has been
reported by several sources as having directly employed
Indonesian military units to provide “security” for their oil and
gas extractions and liquification projects. These forces have
committed gross human rights abuses such as destruction of
property, torture, rape and murder. Exxon has even provided
equipment and grounds for the Indonesian military which was
used to dig mass graves and facilitate torture. Meanwhile, Exxon
has generated over $40 billion from its operations in Aceh,
Indonesia.9 Ironically, the massive energy company had the 26th
largest economy in the world in 2005, surpassing the economy of
Indonesia, ranked 31st. (Anderson, Cavanagh, Lee 2005)
Instead of choosing to redirect actions toward thwarting such
oppression as a necessary reciprocal condition of investment,
companies chose to work with the violent regime. Although
rebels do threaten the extraction operations of multinationals in
Indonesia and elsewhere, such companies are not exempt from
moral obligation to all people presiding in the areas which they
operate. Further, investment and international loans must be
carried out in a way by which they can reach those who need
the most economic assistance, which with today’s technological
capabilities is certainly achievable. Instead of attempting to
enervate violent governments and promote peace through
financial incentives, many of the most powerful corporations
and governments have decided to appropriate violent cycles for
their own gains and institutional objectives. Meanwhile, violence
ensues and spreads among and between civilian groups and
militants alike. (Parry 2005; Kerbo 2006; Pilger 1998)
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Colombia
The implications of armed conflict in Colombia are perplexing,
and, almost in equivalence to the situation in Indonesia, correlate
positively and disproportionately with increasing neo-liberal
conditions. The Colombian Constitution of 1991 documented a
transition into what Aviles (2006:19,125) refers to as a form of
“low-intensity democracy” implemented by a “transnational elite”
of Colombian and US allies both seeking economic liberalization
in Colombia. Such liberalization has occurred in order to
primarily enhance the wealth of the Colombian elite and open
up access for transnational corporations, mostly in extractive
sectors. (Aviles 2006)10 As in the case of Indonesia, the “reforms”
implemented since 1991 have included privatizing state-owned
businesses, liberalizing financial markets and foreign exchange,
and weakening labor protections. (Aviles 2006:1) Elite capitalists,
both foreign and Colombian, have profited much off the “ruin
of farmers through low tariffs on imports.”11 (Hylton 2006:79)
Further, like in Indonesia, such changes would be enforced
through a stream of violence that continues today. (Aviles 2006;
Hylton 2006) Amid the economic changes of 1991, Colombia
witnessed the highest homicide rate in the country’s history.
(Hylton 2006:79) People who quickly became impoverished as a
result of these changes often took to crime to generate needed
income that was lost as a result of economic liberalization,
sometimes turning violent, while leaders of the opposition were
systematically removed by state-sanctioned force. (Arboleda et
al. 2004; Hylton 2006) The U.S and its home-based companies
were able to avoid condemnation by the international community
for supporting violence by simply referring to Colombia as a
democracy, meanwhile generating revenues in collaboration with
the Colombian elite that had no inclination of moving toward
real democratic reform. (Aviles 2006; Hylton 2006)
Neo-liberal conditions were further promoted in the mid-1990’s
when then President Pastrana signed a structural adjustment
contract with the IMF requiring deep cuts in government
spending, reducing restrictions upon foreign investment, and
further accelerating the privatization of public enterprise. (Aviles
2006:124) Meanwhile, as state-supported violence increased in
Colombia, the U.S correspondingly increased military aid. In 1991,
amidst the origin of the vast economic liberalization of Colombia,
the number of youths murdered increased by 70%.12 By 1999,
U.S. military aid to Colombia had increased from $50 to $290
million, while in 1998 there were 1,332 killed in 201 massacres
and 2,500 individual assassinations. In 1998 alone, 10,000 farmers
and peasants were displaced by a combination of coal mining
and paramilitary force. Oxfam has claimed that “deepening
poverty [compounded by neo-liberal impositions] is one of the
main driving forces behind the civil conflicts which are creating
unprecedented numbers of refugees [in Colombia].”13Colombia
had the second largest number of internal refugees in 2003 after
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Sudan at around 3 million. (Chomsky 2003:52-53) The negligence
the U.S government has shown in recognizing atrocities
committed by the Colombian government and the violent groups
it endorses allows it to continue rationalizing a pro-violence
policy centered distinctly in gaining access to land rich in oil and
coal, even while millions of Colombians suffer as a direct result.
Pretexts of fighting terrorism in Colombia are obviously only
attributable to guerrilla terrorists, not to state militias operating
under revenue largely provided by Washington.
Despite a 52% increase in total GDP of Colombia from 1980
through 2000, both inequality and poverty increased drastically.
(Aviles 2006:14) Moreover, equivalent to what happened in
Indonesia, deregulation of the Colombian economy resulted in
short-term capital flow which in turn led to a national economic
crisis and banking collapse during the latter half of the 1990’s.
(Aviles 2006:13; Kingsbury 2002) After significant economic
growth from 1978 to 1995, the economy began to decline in 1997
and turned to negative 4.5% in 1999. Unemployment than doubled
to 20 percent, inequality rose, and macroeconomic performance
declined.14 (Arboleda, Petesch, Blackburn 2004:3) As was the
case of Indonesia, the economic conditions brought on by IMF
policies were direct causes of the economic crisis in Colombia.
(Hylton 2006:79; Pilger 2001) In 1998, further exacerbating
Colombia’s financial instability, the IMF stepped in to sort out
the Colombian economic crisis through the same conditions
that primarily caused it.15 Meanwhile, the poverty resulting from
the economic collapse only worsened the hostile situation of
Colombia’s civil war, creating an inescapable paradox of misery for
the disproportionate amount of Colombians in poverty. (Aviles
2006; Hylton 2006; Arboleda et al. 2004) The national Colombian
poverty rate in 2006 was 65 percent, while the rural rate was an
unbelievable 85 percent. (Arboleda et al. 2004; Aviles 2006; Hylton
2006) The economic liberalization the U.S successfully helped the
Colombian elite implement has increased levels of poverty in the
country, becoming a main driving force of the conflict the U.S
has become willingly embedded to, which will be detailed shorty.
(Arboleda et al. 2004; Aviles 2006; Hylton 2006)
Amidst the country’s economic decline, foreign direct investment
as the percentage of Colombia’s GDP ironically doubled between
1996 and 2002, mostly from energy and finance sectors. (Aviles
2006:91, 57) This was largely a result of the formation of the U.S.Colombia Business Partnership, which was a lobbying group
made up of Occidental Petroleum, GE, Enron, Texaco, and
Colgate-Palmolive. This group successfully lobbied President
Clinton to sanction trade with the Colombian government.
(Aviles 2006:79,131)
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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
National Liberation Army (ELN), the two largest and most active
rebel groups in the country, have greatly opposed the neo-liberal
conditions that have engulfed Colombia. The FARC and ELN
promote a nationalistic and socialist agenda. As unregulated
economic liberalization has been implemented in the country, the
operations of both the FARC and ELN have become more brutal.
(Aviles 2006:23) It was not until the early 1990’s, simultaneous
to neo-liberal impositions of deregulation, privatization, and
weakening of labor protections that the use of child soldiers
became a huge problem in Colombia.16 The number of guerrilla
fighters in Colombia more than doubled from 1994 to 1999, due
largely to the excessive recruitment of child soldiers from less
than 10,000 to more than 20,000 combatants. (Aviles 2006:92)
Colombia has the fourth largest number of child soldiers in the
world. The UN has estimated such numbers to be as high as
14,000, with at least two-thirds being under fifteen years old.17
A quarter of all combined soldiers in Colombia are less than
eighteen years old.18 (Singer 2006:16) Children as young as seven
years old have been recruited by the FARC and by age eight are
trained to use assault rifles and forced to engage in combat.19
(Singer 2006:16-18) Many times, the youngest units, known as
“small boy units,” are put in the front lines. These young children,
being considered expendable by rebel leaders, have even been
sent to the front lines naked in an attempt to confuse and create
sympathy from the enemy and are often the first killed. (Singer
2006:86) Also, if a child loses a weapon, he or she is often forced
to enter combat without one until able to retrieve a replacement
from the enemy.20 40 percent of all killed rebels in Colombia are
less than eighteen years old.21
Rural poverty and inequality resulting from neo-liberal
impositions have stabilized a “market for recruits” of child
soldiers for both sides. (Aviles 2006:104) “Social disruptions
and failures of development caused by globalization, war, and
disease have led not only to greater global conflict and instability,
but also to generational disconnections that create a new pool
of potential recruits,” including, disproportionately, children.
(Singer 2006:38)
Another change that came with Colombia’s “low-intensity
democracy” reform and economic liberalization in the early 1990’s
was the formation of armed civilian paramilitary groups funded
and supported indirectly by the Colombian government and
military and directly by agro-exporters, narco-traffickers, cattle
ranchers and agrarian elites. Such paramilitary groups are hired
to forcefully maintain the present order in Colombia, terrorizing
the civilian population and violently ridding the country of nonsupporters of the current order. The paramilitaries, collectively
known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),

have proven to be as brutal as the guerrilla groups. 70 percent of
all political killings in Colombia during the 1990’s were attributed
to paramilitary factions.22 (Aviles 2006:4; Hylton 2006:80) Yet
these groups have also murdered trade unionists, human rights
leaders, priests, homosexuals and children living on the street or
belonging to political dissidents. (Chomsky 2003; Hylton 2006;
Arboleda et al. 2004) One case in February, 2005 involved the
murder and dismemberment by a paramilitary group using
machetes of three children belonging to a political subversive,
aged 2, 6 and 11, and one 17 year old boy. (Hylton 2006:123) Such
atrocities are funded indirectly by the U.S government, as it has
invested well over $3 billion in the Colombian Military since 1999.
(Blum 2005; Aviles 2006; Hylton 2006) These paramilitary groups
have become contract-killers. (Hylton 2006:12-13; Arboleda et
al. 2004:30) Among numerous companies, Coca-Cola has been
accused of being complicit in paramilitary executions of several
union leaders in the company’s Colombian bottling plants.23
Such cases give evidence to an unfortunate phenomenon: while
“civilians have always suffered in war… the difference is that in
many present day conflicts they are the primary target.” (Singer
2006:4)
As stated by Chomsky (2003:60), “the proportion of atrocities
attributed to the paramilitaries has been increasing as crimes
are privatized in accord with neo-liberal practice…” As a result
of rebel attacks, companies have signed contracts with military
and paramilitary personnel to provide security for oil and coal
extraction.24 Yet human rights abuses have steadily increased
in Colombia since these companies have signed contracts with
military personnel in 1996.25 The same unit hired by Occidental
Petroleum is known for the brutal massacre of ten civilians
in 1994. Though Occidental’s pipelines have been attacked a
total of about 500 times and as much as up to 50 times in one
year, costing the company as much as $3 million a day for ten
days of forced closure, it has generated hundreds of millions
in Colombia annually.26 (Coghlan 2004:134-135) In Casanare,
where British Petroleum operates, the army killed at least two
civilians peacefully protesting the company. Moreover, on
August 5, 2005, the Colombian paramilitary brigade employed by
Occidental assassinated three union leaders, Jorge Priesto, Leonel
Goneyeche, and Hector Alirio Martinez. Since that time, the
company has only employed sixty individuals who are members
of a union.27 Thus, the violence serves at least three functions in
this case: maintaining the current order in Colombia, ensuring
successful extraction operations, and saving labor costs for
disproportionately foreign companies.
Colombia has proven invaluable to a multitude of foreign,
especially U.S, firms, and has even been called a “trial-run for
private war contractors.” U.S. defense contractors are currently
receiving half of the money given by Washington to combat
B R I D G E WAT E R S TAT E C O L L E G E
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the FARC and ELN and fight the “war on drugs.” In 2006, $300
million was spent by the U.S. State and Defense Departments
on home-based private contractors.28 DynCorp is the largest
private military contractor working in Colombia, described by
some as performing “mercenary” operations. Furthermore, the
Colombian National Police are the world’s largest user of Bell’s
Huey II Helicopters, used to patrol Occidental Petroleum’s
pipelines in Colombia.29 (Hylton 2006:118) Thus, the ulterior
motive of U.S involvement in Colombia is clear when one UScompany is generating revenue protecting the operations of
another U.S-based company in a foreign country that is literally
torn apart. Moreover, the Lockheed Martin Corporation, another
U.S.-based enterprise, does much work on Colombian aircraft,
and has seen profits triple between 2002 and 2006 to over $80
billion.30 A main objective of U.S involvement in Colombia has
clearly been to appropriate tactics of the civil war to the benefit
of U.S companies, even at the expense of innocent, impoverished
Colombian lives.
Instead of withholding investment in Colombia until something
positive is done about the violence, the multinational companies
and U.S government have continued to comply with business as
usual. The companies, governments, and military contractors
seemingly consider themselves above the rule of international law,
and the innocent people caught in the middle of a hellish war zone
are ignored by the state, the complicit corporations, investors and
financial institutions, and the international community alike. The
failure of these entities to sufficiently acknowledge the suffering
in Colombia and elsewhere has contributed to a worsening in the
types of violence prevalent in impoverished, war-torn regions,
as people become increasingly desperate while on the edge of
survival. (Hylton 2006; Kerbo 2006) While the morale of the
impoverished is bled through their macroeconomic and political
repression, the “higher immorality”31 of the transnational elite
has held strong.
Conclusion
While valuable natural resources are extracted and exported West
by mostly Western companies, impoverished masses in places
like Colombia and Indonesia are denied their most fundamental
human rights. Meanwhile, incompetent and/or negligent policies
of international financial institutions engulf these regions in
debt through skyrocketing interest rates, and powerful Western
governments and arms industries provide the diplomatic and
physical means of oppression to corrupt and brutal regimes. These
regimes, in Indonesia, Colombia and elsewhere, while enriching
themselves, violently exacerbate the misery of millions of their
poor, already plagued with malnutrition and unemployment.
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Meanwhile the violent cycle between rebel groups that originally
sought justice and corrupt state armies creates an atmosphere of
all-out chaos where civilians are caught in the middle and often
targeted directly. Violence becomes normalized as the purpose of
war is mutated toward criminality and inequality expands.
Arms industries and military contractors generate notable
profits while supplying high-wage jobs in high-tech Western
industries and investors in the U.S and elsewhere also benefit. Yet
millions suffer in the developing world as they are denied basic
resources necessary for survival (which are plentiful in the world)
and face the constant threat of indescribably horrific violence,
cementing their oppressed existence multilaterally through
dangerous unilateral policies and ideologies of the transnational
power elite. The objectives of war have been seemingly altered
throughout much of the globe, reflecting those which aim not
to secure a means toward peace, but enable a perpetual state of
conflict, maintaining the current global power structure. (Singer
2006:4) While the distribution of resources is becoming ever
more skewed in favor of the world’s dominant powers, those
within weak states, and seemingly even the most self-acclaimed
‘civilized’ of states, have become more neglectful of the global
poor. Further exacerbating this global trend, rapidly growing
technology has insofar enabled not the equitable dissemination
of wealth and resources to a majority of the world’s inhabitants,
but rather more efficient ways for groups to kill, plunder, and
dominate entire societies. The main imperative of those of power
must shift; only through the stabilization of present war-torn
and decimated states can those such as the U.S secure indefinite
peace for its populations, and, concurrently, the world.
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